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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel, non-linear collusion at-
tack on digital fingerprinting systems. The attack is proposed for
fingerprinting systems with finite alphabet but can be extended
to continuous alphabet. We analyze the error probability of the
attack for some classes of proposed random and deterministic
schemes and obtain a bound on the number of colluders necessary
to correctly estimate the host signal. That is, it requires fewer
number of colluders to defeat the fingerprinting scheme. Our
simulation results show that our attack is more powerful in
practice than predicted by the theoretical bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGITAL fingerprinting schemes have been invented fortraitor tracing as a means of copyright protection. To
this end, each user is provided with his own individually
modified copy of the host signal (i.e., the content that is
copyright protected). The modification entails embedding a
unique signature, also known as a fingerprint, in the host
signal. The fingerprint can later be retrieved by a detector
examining an illegal copy of the content in order to implicate
the users who took part in the forgery.
A myriad of fingerprint designs and detection procedures
have been proposed in the literature. Examples include or-
thogonal fingerprints [1], regular simplex fingerprints [5],
random Gaussian fingerprints [3], [7], and fingerprints with
equiangular tight frames (ETF) [10]. The main consideration
in design of fingerprints is their rate, i.e., number of copies
that could be distributed and their robustness against attacks,
in particular collusion attacks.
In a collusion attack, a group of users combine their copies
to create a forgery in order to defeat the detection process. For
instance, one such type of collusion attack is linear averaging,
in which the colluders estimate the host signal as the linear
average of their marked copies. This attack is studied in
numerous works [2], [4], [6].
A novel collusion attack is introduced in [9] that proves
detrimental against both random and deterministic fingerprints
as long as they are from a finite alphabet. The entries of
random fingerprints are chosen i.i.d. from a finite set according
to a distribution while deterministic fingerprints are designed
non-randomly often according to some geometric or algebraic
property. The analysis in [9] shows that if the size of collusion
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is of order O(logN) where N is the length of a real-valued
host signal, the attackers can accurately estimate the host
signal with high probability. In particular, this attack improves
over the previous best-known attack against ETF fingerprints
[10], [15], i.e., the linear averaging attack. It was shown that
finite alphabet ETF random or deterministic fingerprints can
withstand linear averaging attack as long as number of col-
luders is bounded by O(N/ logaM) and O(
√
N) respectively,
where M denotes the total number of fingerprinted copies [10].
In this work, we analyze the error probability of the
aforementioned collusion attack against uniformly symmetric
random fingerprints and obtain a bound on the number of
colluders necessary to succeed with high probability. Further-
more, we study the performance of the attack against two
more probabilistic fingerprints: optimal probabilistic finger-
print (OPF) codes, aka Tardos codes, and column-wise random
fingerprints (Tardos-like codes). The OPF codes are introduced
in [17] that are -secure against K pirates and have length
O(K2 log 1/). Our analysis shows that our collusion attack
outperforms the linear averaging [12], minority voting [12],
and the majority voting attacks [14], the latter two known to
be effective collusion attacks against the OPF codes.
We further generalize the application of this collusion attack
to continuous alphabet codes, specifically Gaussian finger-
prints by quantizing their support set. Our analysis shows a
good performance of the generalized attack compared with the
uniform linear averaging attack, proved to be optimal among
the class of order-statistic collusion attacks, when the colluders
are subject to a mean squared distortion constraint [6].
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section II de-
scribes the mathematical model of the fingerprinting problem.
In Section III, we present the proposed collusion attack.
Section IV, V, and VI examine the attack’s effectiveness
on both deterministic and random fingerprints and propose
lower bounds on the number of colluders that can break the
fingerprinting system with high probability. In Section VIII,
we use simulations to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
attack on two types of fingerprint codes. We present our
conclusions in Section IX.
Throughout this paper, we use bold upper-case letters to
denote matrices, boldface for vectors, lower-case for scalar
values, and calligraphic fonts for sets.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
In this section we describe our mathematical setup for
fingerprint embedding.
Consider a host signal s ∈ RN and M(> N) marked copies
of the host signal s distributed among M users. In particular,
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2the mth user receives the copy,
qm := fm + s , (1)
where fm ∈ RN is the mth fingerprint. We assume that all
fingerprints have equal energy, i.e.,
||fm||22 = 1 ,m = 1, ...,M, (2)
in the case of deterministic construction, and
E[||fm||2] = 1 ,m = 1, ...,M, (3)
in the case of random construction.
Let F denote the N × M matrix whose columns are the
fingerprints {fm}Mm=1, and let {em}Mm=1 denote the standard
basis in RM , i.e., for any m ∈ {1, ...,M}, em(i) = 0 when
i 6= m and 1 otherwise. Then (1) may be written as
qm = Fem + s . (4)
The goal of the fingerprinting process is to prevent users
from illegally sharing their copies. Therefore, the fingerprint
detector must be able to detect the users or some subset of the
users who took part in the forgery.
III. ATTACK STRATEGY
In this section we introduce a new type of collusion attack
against fingerprints from a finite alphabet.
Consider a fingerprinting matrix F = [fi,j ]N×M where the
entries are chosen deterministically or at random from a finite
set Ξ = {ξ1, ..., ξl} ⊂ R, such that ξ1 < ξ2 < ... < ξl. Given
that the attackers know Ξ = {ξ1, ..., ξl}, they can construct
the following set:
U = {u ∈ R : ∃ unique (i, j) s.t. u = ξi − ξj}. (5)
Each element of set U is a real number that corresponds to
the difference of a unique ordered pair in Ξ × Ξ. Note that
|U| ≥ 2 because ±(ξl − ξ1) are always in U .
Suppose K users collude with the goal of learning at
least one of their fingerprints and subsequently obtaining the
host signal. Without loss of generality denote their copies
by {q1, ...,qK}. The attackers form the N × K matrix
Q = [q1...qK ]. Furthermore, they choose one of the copies,
e.g., q1 (it will become clear that this choice is immaterial)
and compute the N ×K matrix A whose ith column is given
by q1 − qi or equivalently f1 − fi. Denote the ith row of A
by ai. Whenever the attackers encounter an element of A, ai,j
that belongs to U , they can uniquely determine (ξ, ξ′) ∈ Ξ×Ξ
s.t. ai,j = ξ−ξ′. To illustrate how this helps the attackers learn
one of the fingerprints, we provide the following example:
Example 1: Assume 4 colluders took part in the forgery.
Furthermore, assume Ξ = {−1, 0, 1} and let the ith row of Q
be [si, si + 1, si + 1, si − 1]. Hence, ai = [0,−1,−1, 1] and
U = {−2, 2}. Although no element of ai is in U , by computing
pairwise differences of elements of ai, the colluders can learn
fi,1 as follows: ai,2−ai,4 = (fi,1−fi,2)−(fi,1−fi,4) = fi,4−
fi,2 = −2. Therefore, fi,4 = −1, fi,2 = 1 and subsequently
from fi,1 − fi,4 = 1, it follows that fi,1 = 0.
As illustrated by Example 1, looking at entries of A alone
was not enough to learn the fingerprints. Therefore, for each
row i of matrix A the attackers compute the set:
Ai := {∆ai : ∆ai = ai,j − ai,k : k, j = 1, ...,K}. (6)
If ∆ai ∈ U , then attackers can learn fi,1. This is because
ai,j = fi,1−fi,j and ai,k = fi,1−fi,k. Thus ∆ai = fi,k−fi,j
and following the definition of set U , (fi,k, fi,j) is uniquely
determined. Subsequently fi,1 can be computed as
fi,1 = ai,j + fi,j , (7)
Once fi,1 is known, all others fi,j , can be determined from
(7). If no elements of Ai: ∆ai /∈ U , the attackers estimate fi,1
by the first component of b∗i = (b∗i,1, ..., b∗i,K), where
b∗i = arg maxb∈B(ai)
p(b), (8)
where p(b) denotes the probability of vector b and B(ai) is
given by
B(ai):=
{
b = (b1, ..., bK) ∈ ΞK : b1 − bj = ai,j , j = 1, ...,K
}
.
(9)
That is, the attackers choose the most likely fingerprints that
are consistent with the set of observations Ai. If there are
several solutions to (8), the attackers choose one of them arbi-
trarily. The attackers compute p(b) using their side information
about the structure of fingerprints. For instance, if they know
that the entries of F were chosen i.i.d. at random according to
p(Ξ) = (pξ1 , ..., pξl), then
p(b) =
K∏
i=1
pbi . (10)
Recall that attackers could learn fi,1 if they could use the
Equation (7). Otherwise, their failure probability depends on
how F was generated. Note that by minimizing |U|, the de-
signer increases the likelihood of attackers’ failure regardless
of the structure of F.
IV. ATTACK ON EQUIANGULAR TIGHT FRAME
In this section we study the performance of our attack on
a deterministic fingerprint known as equiangular tight frame
(ETF) fingerprints from a finite alphabet, proposed in [15]. Al-
though it was shown in [10] that deterministic ETF fingerprints
with finite alphabet are robust against the linear averaging
attack, namely, if the size of collusion is O(
√
N), then with
high probability the focused detector, which performs a binary
hypothesis test for each user to decide whether that particular
user is guilty [10], is able to detect at least one of the attackers,
we will show that these type of fingerprints can not withstand
the proposed attack.
A frame is a collection of vectors {fm}M1 ∈ RN with frame
bounds 0 < A ≤ B <∞ such that
A||x||2 ≤
M∑
m=1
| < x, fm > |2 ≤ B||x||2,
3for every x ∈ RN . The frame is tight if A = B. An equiangular
tight frame (ETF) is a unit norm tight frame with the additional
property that there exists a constant c such that
| < fm′ , fm > | = c, ∀ m 6= m′.
The construction in [15] uses a tensor-like combination of a
Steiner system’s adjacency matrix and a regular simplex.
A Steiner system [8] with parameters r, h, n, written as
S(r, h, n), is an n-element set S together with a set of h-
element subsets of S (called blocks) with the property that
each r-element subset of S is contained in exactly one block.
The matrix representation of this system is a
(
n
r
)
/
(
h
r
) × n
binary matrix such that each row contains precisely h ones
and each column has
(
n−1
r
)
/
(
h−1
r
)
ones. Let Hm0×m0 to be
a Hadamard matrix of order m0 [11]. The proposed ETF
design in [15] is obtained by substituting non-zero elements
of a S(r, h, n) with an arbitrary row of H which contains
−1. Therefore, the fingerprint matrix FETF (r, h, n,m0) is an
N ×M matrix with entries in {−1, 0,+1} where M = m0n
and N =
(
n
r
)
/
(
h
r
)
. It is usually assumed that n > 8h.
Next result derives a lower bound on the number of at-
tackers that can break the fingerprinting system given by
FETF (r, h, n,m0). The system is broken if the attackers can
estimate the host signal s accurately with high probability.
Theorem 4.1: Let FETF (r, h, n,m0) denote the ETF fin-
gerprinting matrix and let K denote the size of coalition set.
If
K ≥ 2 log 4N/δ, (11)
where N =
(
n
r
)
/
(
h
r
)
, then the host signal can be correctly
estimated with probability greater than 1− δ.
Proof: Proof is in Appendix.
V. ATTACK ON RANDOM STRUCTURE
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed
attack on random fingerprints from a finite alphabet.
Random finite fingerprint matrix F is an N by M matrix
whose entries are chosen i.i.d at random from Ξ = {ξ1, ..., ξl}
with probability p(fi,j = ξk) = pξk for k ∈ {1, ..., l}.
Moreover, we assume that the fingerprints satisfy the energy
constraint (3) and without loss of generality, we assume
E[fi,j ] = 0.
Recall that the attackers might fail to estimate the ith
component of the host signal correctly if Ai ∩ U = ∅, where
Ai and U are given by (6) and (5), respectively. Let b ∈ ΞK
and b˜i := b1 − bi; then B(b˜), where B(·) is given by (9),
denotes the set of all vectors in ΞK that are consistent with
the observation vector b˜.
Attackers estimate b by c∗(b˜) = arg maxc∈B(b˜) p(c) that is
the most likely vector in B(b˜). Since the entries of F are i.i.d.,
the probability of error in estimating any component of s is
the same and is given by
p(E) =
∑
b∈ΞK
p(b)p
(
b 6= c∗(b˜)) , (12)
where p(b) is defined in (10).
Computing (12) in a general setting might be complicated.
However, there are some settings in which we can compute
p(E) explicitly or at least bound it. The rest of this section
focuses on such scenarios.
Definition 5.1: A random fingerprinting matrix FN×M with
parameters w ∈ N and p = (p0, ..., pw) > 0 is called symmet-
ric if fi,j are chosen i.i.d. from Ξ = {−wz , ...,− 1z , 0, 1z , ..., wz },
such that p(fi,j = kz ) = p(fi,j = −kz ) = pk for every
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., w}.
Note that z is the normalization factor for the fingerprints
in order to satisfy (3). Furthermore, FN×M is called uniformly
symmetric if pk =
1
2w + 1
for all k.
Lemma 5.2: The proposed attack succeeds against a uni-
formly symmetric fingerprinting system with probability
greater than 1 − δ as long as the number of colluders, K
satisfies
K ≥ log(N/δ)
log(1 + 12w )
.
Proof: Proof is in Appendix.
In general, the source distribution pΞ = (p1, ...., pl) are
not known to the attackers. However, in this case, attackers
can estimate the source distribution, for example, using an
empirical estimator over those rows of A that have non-empty
intersection with the set U . Namely, they find I := {i : Ai ∩
U 6= ∅}. As discussed in previous section, the attackers can
determine (fi,1, ..., fi,K) correctly for every i ∈ I. Because
the entries of F are chosen i.i.d., the attackers can estimate pΞ
over the set {fi,j : i ∈ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ K}.
A. Random Ternary Fingerprints
A random ternary fingerprint (RTF) is an N ×M random
symmetric fingerprinting system with parameter w = 1, and
p = (1 − 2p, p). Next result gives a lower bound on the
number of attackers that can detect the host signal with high
probability.
Lemma 5.3: An application of the proposed attack on an
RTF system succeeds with probability greater than 1 − δ as
long as
K ≥ log(
2N
δ )
log 4/3
, (13)
where K is the number of colluders.
Proof: Proof is in Appendix.
In Section VIII we will see the performance of the proposed
attack on RTF s for different values of N and M through
simulations.
VI. ATTACK ON PROBABILISTIC FINGERPRINT CODES
This section studies the performance of the proposed attack
on binary random fingerprinting codes for M users with length
N . Specifically, we consider two such fingerprinting structures.
In the first structure which is proposed in [17], each row of
the fingerprinting matrix F is generated independently from a
fixed distribution. In the second structure, each user (column),
independent of other users, generates its own fingerprints.
4A. Row-Wise Generated (Tardos Code)
In this section we perform our attack on a probabilistic
structure known as optimal probabilistic fingerprint (OPF)
Codes, introduced in [17]. These codes are an improvement of
the codes proposed by Boneh-Shaw in [18]. The OPF codes
are -secure (see the following definition) against K pirates
and have length O(K2 log 1/).
Definition 6.1: [17] Let σ be an algorithm that takes a string
y ∈ ΞN (forged copy by the colluders) as input, and produces
a subset σ(y) ⊆ {1, ...,M} (the set of accused users). For
∅ 6= K ⊆ {1, ...,M} a K-strategy is an algorithm ρ that takes
the sub-matrix of FN×M formed by the rows with indices in K
as input, and generate a forgery y ∈ ΞN as output and satisfies
the marking condition that for all positions 1 ≤ i ≤ N , if all
the values Fi,j for j ∈ K agree with some letter ξ ∈ Ξ, then
yi = ξ. A code is called -secure against coalition of size K, if
for any K ⊆ {1, ...,M} with |K| ≤ K and for any K-strategy
ρ, the error probability
p (σ(ρ(FK)) = ∅ or σ(ρ(FK)) * K) ≤ .
The code is constructed as follows [17]: Let c = dlog(1/)e.
The fingerprinting matrix FOPF is of size (100K2c =)N×M .
Let %i be independent, identically distributed random variable
from [1/(300K), 1− 1/(300K)] for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}, where
%i = sin
2(ri) and ri ∼ Uniform[t, pi/2− t] with 0 < t < pi/4,
sin2(t) = 1/(300K).
FOPF is constructed by selecting entry fi,j independently
from {0, 1} with p(fi,j = 1) = %i for i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Notice that the OPF code is similar to the previous structure,
except that, the fingerprinting matrix is constructed row-wise
(row i with probability %i) instead of column-wise (column j
with probability pj).
The detection procedure for this structure is as follows [17].
The detector defines matrix UN×M such that
ui,j =

√
1−%i
%i
, if fi,j = 1
−
√
%i
1−%i , if fi,j = 0
and Z := 20cK. Then it accuses user j whenever (yTU)j >
Z, where y is the forgery.
Similar to the previous section, consider the coalition K =
{1, ...,K} who performs the proposed attack in Section III on
this structure. The colluders estimate the probabilities by
%̂i :=
mi
|K| , i ∈ I, (14)
where mi := |{fi,j = 1 : j ∈ K}|. The attacker’s estimation
of f1 will be
f̂i,1 =
{
fi,1 if i ∈ I,
1 otherwise.
Theorem 6.2: Suppose a coalition of size K ≥ 4 perform
the proposed attack on the above fingerprinting system with
matrix FN×M . Then the number of rows that they fail to
estimate correctly (N − |I|) is bounded by 2CN/√K with
probability at least
1−
√
K − C
NC
,
where 1 < C < 1.3 is a constant.
Proof: Proof is in Appendix.
Colluders use Algorithm 1 to forge y and hide their tracks
as follows: They estimate the signal sˆ and its Fourier transform
F [̂s]. Then add Gaussian and uniform noises to the magnitude
and the phase, respectively. They add a random vector cw
in the time domain to form the final forgery. Vector w is
constructed by setting the elements at the indices that the
attackers can detect (i.e., I) to zero while choosing a random
element from {−1, 0, 1} for the other elements.
Note that F [·] in this algorithm denotes the Fourier trans-
form and ]z denotes the phase of a complex number z.
Algorithm 1
1: Input : I,q1, f̂1, (σ20 , c1, c2) > 0.
2: Output : y.
3: for i = 1, ..., N do
4: If i ∈ I; wi ←− 0.
5: If i /∈ I; wi ←− {0, 1,−1} w.p. {1/2, 1/4, 1/4}.
6: end for
7: ŝ←− q1 − f̂1
8: |F [̂s]| ←− |F [̂s]|+ a1; a1 ∼ N (0, σ20).
9: ]F [̂s]←− ]F [̂s] + a2; a2 ∼ Uniform[0, pi/(2Kc1)].
10: y←− F−1[F [̂s]] + c2w.
Section VIII-E demonstrates the performance of this attack
on a OPF code.
B. Column-Wise Generated Fingerprints
Each entry of the fingerprinting matrix FN×M is chosen in-
dependently from {0, 1} with p(fi,j = 1) = pj , j = 1, ...,M ,
where pj = sin2(rj) is selected by picking uniformly at
random the value rj ∈ [t, pi/2−t] for some fixed 0 < t < pi/4,
sin2(t) = a > 0. Note that in this set up, since the alphabet
set is {0, 1}, we have U = {−1, 1}.
Suppose a coalition w.l.o.g. K = {1, ...,K} performs the
proposed attack in section III on this structure. Let I ⊆
{1, ..., N} be the set of all indices that the colluders could
estimate their fingerprints correctly. For this structure, I is the
index set of those rows in A := [q1 − q1, ...,q1 − qK ] that
have at least one non-zero entry.
Next step, the colluders estimate their corresponding pjs using
empirical estimation over rows with index set I, namely
p̂j :=
nj
|I| , j ∈ K, (15)
where nj = |{fi,j = 1 : i ∈ I}|. Theorem 6.3 describes how
accurate this estimation will be. Finally, the attackers use the
above empirical distributions to decide about those rows with
indices belonging to {1, ..., N} \ I. To do so, they compute
ptot :=
1
K
∑
j∈K
p̂j .
Then for i ∈ {1, ..., N} \ I and j ∈ K,
f̂i,j =
{
1, if ptot > 0.5 + τ
0, if ptot < 0.5− τ
5In case of 0.5− τ ≤ ptot ≤ 0.5 + τ , they pick n∗ indices out
of {1, ..., N} \ I randomly and set them to be one and the
rest to be zero, where n∗ is chosen such that the empirical
distributions do not vary, namely∣∣∣∣minj p̂j − n∗ + |I|minj p̂jN
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣maxj p̂j − n∗ + |I|maxj p̂jN
∣∣∣∣ .
Equivalently,
n∗ :=
⌊
minj p̂j + maxj p̂j
2
(N − |I|)
⌋
.
The final forgery in this attack will be
y = q1 − f̂1.
Theorem 6.3: Consider a probabilistic fingerprinting code
F of size N × M as it is described above and let K be a
coalition of size K. Then
• the number of rows that they fail to estimate correctly
(N − |I|) is bounded by N/K with probability at least
1− 12K2
(
3
8
)K
− 8K
2
N2K
, K > 6.
• E[||f1 − f̂1||2] ≤ N/2K−1.
• with probability at least 1− 2K
N (2−1/2K−2)
, we have
max
j∈K
|pj − p̂j | <
√
logN
N
.
Proof: Proof is in Appendix.
VII. ATTACK ON RANDOM GAUSSIAN STRUCTURE
In this section, we generalize the proposed attack for the
case that the alphabet set is continuous.
Suppose the entries of the fingerprinting matrix FN×M are
chosen i.i.d. at random from a normal distribution N (0, σ2),
such that (3) holds i.e. σ2 = 1/N . The main idea here is
to convert this fingerprinting structure into a finite alphabet
structure by quantizing the support set of the fingerprints and
then apply the attack strategy of Section III.
Using the Chebyshev’s inequality, the attackers can assume
that there exists a ξ > 0 such that the fingerprinting entries,
{fk,m}s are chosen only from a bounded interval [−ξ, ξ] with
high probability. This is a good assumption since for any  >
0, there exists a ξ > 0, such that
p (|fi,j | ≥ ξ) ≤ .
Furthermore, the attackers discretize the values in this interval
into 2w,w ∈ N discrete values {ξ̂i}2wi=1 as follows: they assign
ξ̂i = −ξ+ ξ2w (2i− 1) to all the values that belong to interval
[−ξ + ξw (i − 1),−ξ + ξw i) for some i ∈ {1, ..., 2w} and use
{ξ̂i}2wi=1 as their alphabet set. Their next step is to represent
the entries of the matrix A introduced in Section III (whose
ith column is given by q1 − qi) using the new alphabet set
i.e., {ξ̂i}2wi=1. This can be done using the fact that each entry
of the matrix A will fall into [ ξw (i− j− 1), ξw (i− j+ 1)), for
-2-3-4 1 2 3 4-1
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Fig. 1: Quantization rule for the entries of the matrix A, when
ξ = 2, w = 2, and α = 1.4 .
some i, j ∈ {1, ..., 2w} with probability at least (1− )2. The
attackers estimate A = [ak,m] by Âα = [âk,m], where
âk,m =

− ξw (2w − 1), if ak,m < −2ξ
ξ
w (i− j), if ak,m ∈ [ ξw (i− j − 1), ξw (i− j))
for i < j
− ξw , if ak,m ∈ [− ξw ,−α ξ2w )
0, if |ak,m| ≤ α ξ2w
ξ
w , if ak,m ∈ (α ξ2w , ξw ]
ξ
w (i− j), if ak,m ∈ ( ξw (i− j), ξw (i− j + 1)]
for i > j
ξ
w (2w − 1), if ak,m > 2ξ
(16)
for some i, j ∈ {1, ..., 2w} and 0 < α ≤ 2. Next we provide
an example for the case when ξ = 2 and w = 2 to motivate
our quantization choices.
Example 2: Let ξ = 2 and w = 2. The attacker’s alphabet
will be {−3/2,−1/2, 1/2, 3/2}. If ak,m := fk,1 − fk,m ∈
[−4,−3), then with probability at least (1−)2, we have −2 <
fk,1 < −1 and 1 < fk,m < 2. In other word, fˆk,1 = −3/2
and fˆk,m = 1/2, equivalently, âk,m = −3/2 − 1/2 = −3.
Figure 1 illustrates this quantization.
Now, suppose ak,m belongs to (−3,−2). In this case, there
are three possible events: E1 := {−2 < fk,1 < −1, 1 <
fk,m < 2}, E2 := {−2 < fk,1 < −1, 0 < fk,m < 1}, or
E3 := {−1 < fk,1 < 0, 1 < fk,m < 2}. If E1 is the true
event, then âk,m = −3/2− 1/2 = −3. However, if either E2
or E3 is the true event, then âk,m = −1/2−3/2 = −2. Since
p(E2∪E3) > p(E1), we encode âk,m = −2. The quantization
rule given by (16) is obtained similarly, except for the case
that ak,m ∈ [−1, 1). In this case, we consider a small gap
interval controlled by α. When α = 0, âk,m = 0 is neglected
and when α = 2, the whole interval [−1, 1] is quantized into
0.
Without loss of generality, suppose the first K users are
involved in the attack and f̂i is the attacker’s estimate of fi for
1 ≤ i ≤ K. Then their final forgery is
ŷ =
1
K
K∑
i=1
(qi − f̂i) + w, (17)
where w is a noise vector with mean zero and variance σ20
introduced by the attackers in order to hide their tracks. Note
that one can easily find an upper bound on the expected
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Fig. 2: Probability of estimating at least 1% of the host signal
incorrectly as a function of the collusion size K for RTF
structure.
estimation error of this attack as follows:
E
[
||f1 − f̂1||2
]1/2
≤
√
N maxj E[|f1,j − f̂1,j |2] ≤
√
N
(∫∞
0
(x+ (2w − 1)ξ/2w)2√
2piσ2
e−
x2
2σ2 dx
)1/2
≤√
N
2
(
σ + (2w−1)ξ2w
)
.
Since σ = 1/
√
N , by letting ξ = O(1/
√
N), the above error
is bounded as N grows. Later in Section VIII, we study the
performance of this attack when w = 2 and compare its
performance with the uniform linear averaging attack which
was proved to outperform order-statistic collusion attacks on
random Gaussian fingerprints when the colluders are subject
to a mean-squared distortion constraint [6]. The simulation
result demonstrates the excellent performance of the proposed
algorithm even in continuous case.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
Herein, we simulate the performance of our attack on both
random and deterministic structures.
A. Random Ternary Fingerprints
We attacked two RTF systems with probability vectors p1 =
(2/3, 1/6) and p2 = (1/3, 1/3) each for three different dimen-
sions (N,M) ∈ {(729, 2016), (2187, 8128), (8128, 16384)}.
Figure 2 depicts the probability of failing to estimate the
signal s correctly as a function of the number of colluders
for the random ternary structures. The failure event is defined
as estimating at least 1% of the host signal incorrectly. As
Figures 2 illustrates that the number of colluders necessary to
estimate the host signal in RTF system is much less than what
Lemma 5.3 suggests. This confirms the effectiveness of our
proposed attack in practice beyond the theoretical limit.
B. ETF Fingerprints
We attacked two ETF systems with matrices F1 =
FETF (2, 7, 91, 16) and F2 = FETF (2, 2, 27, 128), respec-
tively. Figure 3 depicts the probability of failure event for these
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
K
P e
 
 
F1
F2
Fig. 3: Probability of ||s − sˆ|| > 0 as a function of collusion
size K for ETF structure.
two ETF structures, when the failure event is defined as at
least estimating one coordinate of the host signal s incorrectly.
Again the number of users that succeed at estimating the host
signal is much less than what the bounds in Theorem 4.1
suggests.
C. Gaussian Fingerprints
We also attacked two random Gaussian fingerprinting sys-
tems with dimensions (N,M) ∈ {(100, 250), (1000, 2070)}.
The attackers parameters were set at (ξ, w, α) = (0.12, 2, 1)
and the forgery was done according to (17). Figure 4 depicts
||fi1− f̂i1 ||, the estimation error of the attackers i, as a function
of the collusion size K.
We compared the performance of our attack against the
uniform linear averaging attack, the optimal attack in the
class of order-statistic collusion attacks on random Gaussian
fingerprints when the colluders are subject to a mean-squared
distortion constraint [6]. The colluders in that attack create
their forgery by uniformly averaging their copies and adding
an i.i.d. Gaussian noise. We evaluated performance of both
attacks for a focused fingerprint detector, which performs a
binary hypothesis test for each user to decide whether that
particular user is guilty [10].
Figures 5 and 6 show the probability of detecting at least
one colluder as a function of the number of colluders K using
the focused detector.
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Fig. 4: Estimation error ||fi1 − f̂i1 || for random Gaussian
fingerprints ((N,M) = (1000, 2070) ).
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Fig. 5: A comparison of probability of detecting at least one
colluder for our proposed attack vs. uniform linear averaging
attack as a function of number of colluders for random
Gaussian fingerprints ((N,M) = (1000, 2070)).
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Fig. 6: A comparison of probability of detecting at least one
colluder for our proposed attack vs. uniform linear averaging
attack as a function of number of colluders for random
Gaussian fingerprints ((N,M) = (100, 250)).
D. Tardos-like (Column-Wise Random) fingerprints
The performance of the proposed attack against the fin-
gerprinting code proposed in Section VI-B is studied in this
section. We generated a fingerprinting code with parameters
(N,M, t′) = (5600, 2100, pi/1000). K ∈ {4, ..., 11} number
of colluders were selected randomly 500 times to arrange the
attack against this code.
K ∈ {4, ..., 11} number of colluders were selected ran-
domly 500 times to carryout the attack. Figure 7 demonstrates
the worst estimation error rate incurred by an attacker, i.e.,
maxj∈K ||fj − f̂j ||2/N along with the theoretical bound intro-
duced in Theorem 6.3 as a function of number of colluders.
The plot suggests that in practice the performance of our attack
is considerably better than predicted by the theoretical bound.
Additionally, we evaluated the performance of our attack
against the focused detector which aims to identify at least one
of the colluders. We selected K attackers and performed the
attack 500 times at random. Figure 8 illustrates the probability
of catching at least one colluder as a function of number of
colluders. In the figure, probability of catching Pc is calculated
as
Pc :=
#trials that at least one colluders is detected
#total trials
. (18)
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Fig. 7: Worst estimation error rate of the fingerprints and its
corresponding theoretical bound for the CWC fingerprinting
structure.
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Fig. 8: A plot of the probability of catching at least one
colluder Pc as a function of the number of colluders for the
CWC structure.
E. Row-Wise Generated Fingerprints (Tardos Code)
We simulated our proposed attack against the optimal proba-
bilistic fingerprints (OPF), known as Tardos codes, introduced
in Section VI-A. We considered a length N = 7500 OPF code
designed with parameters (k, ) = (5, 0.1) for M = 1500
number of users. Our first measure of success of the attack is
the size of the set of fingerprint indices the colluders detected
correctly, |I|. Figure 9 demonstrates the rate |I|/N as a
function of the coalition size for K = {2, 3, 4, 5}.
K
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Fig. 9: A plot of |I|/N as a function of the number of
colluders for the Tardos code with parameter (k, ) = (5, 0.1).
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Fig. 10: Comparison of the fales positive (FP) probabilities
of different attacks against the Tardos code with parameter
(k, ) = (5, 0.1).
Next, we selected K = 5 users randomly and attacked
the fingerprinting scheme using the forgery described by
Algorithm 1 for 3000 trials. We compared the performance of
our attack against the uniform averaging, minority voting, and
majority voting attacks [12], [14]. In minority voting attack,
the attackers output a symbol that occurs less often than all
the others in their copies. Similarly, in majority voting, the
attackers output the most frequent symbol [13]. All attacks
were evaluated against the optimal accusation detector of
Tardos [17], which was described in Section VI-A. We com-
puted the false positive (FP) probability, i.e., the probability of
accusing at least one innocent user, as a function of the ratio
of the fingerprint power to the noise power introduced by the
colluders (Ratio) for all 3 attacks. More precisely,
Fingerprint to Noise Power Ratio (FNPR) := 20 log10
||f1||
||y− s|| ,
where y is the forgery. As Figure 10 illustrates, the proposed
attack outperforms the others since for the same number of
colluders and the same FNPR, it results in a higher false
positive.
IX. CONCLUSION
We develop a new attack on fingerprinting system with finite
alphabet fingerprints. We derive theoretical bounds on the
number of colluders that can defeat the fingerprinting system.
Through simulation, we show that a much smaller number of
attackers can indeed defeat the system in practice. Our analysis
suggests that the designer of a random fingerprinting system
with parameters (Ξ,pΞ) should select the fingerprints from an
alphabet Ξ whose associated uniquely decodable set, U , has
a small cardinality. Moreover, the fingerprinter should pick
a source distribution pΞ that maximizes the error probability
(12) subject to the energy constraint (3).
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Proof of Theorem 4.1
Assume K colluders {i1, ..., iK} take part in the forgery. Let
Ei to be the event that the attackers estimate si incorrectly, i.e.,
Ei := {sˆi 6= si}. Since the attackers know that the fingerprint
matrix is sparse, when they cannot estimate fi,i1
1 uniquely
(i.e., Ai ∩ U = ∅), the performance of the proposed attack
is lower bounded by the following attack. They estimate fi,i1
with an element of B ((fi,i1 − fi,i1 , ..., fi,i1 − fi,iK )) with the
maximum number of zeros. The error event Ei only occurs
when vector (fi,i1 , ..., fi,iK ) both does not contain the pair
(−1,+1) and the number of its non-zero elements exceeds
the number of its zeros. Since each row of FETF (r, h, n,m0)
has exactly hm0 non-zero elements, and each row of the
corresponding Hadamard matrix has equal number of +1 and
−1, each row of FETF (r, h, n,m0) has exactly hm0/2, −1s.
Therefore, we can upper bound the error event as
p(Ei) ≤ 2
∑
i≤bK/2c
(
M − hm0
i
)(
hm0/2
K − i
)
/
(
M
K
)
. (19)
Next we introduce an upper bound on the above error proba-
bility, first we show that for K ≥ 2 and n > 8h,∑
i≤bK/2c
(
M − hm0
i
)(
hm0/2
K − i
)
(20)
≤ 2
(
M − hm0
bK/2c
)(
hm0/2
b(K + 1)/2c
)
.
The proof is by induction on K. The case K = 2 is trivial
since M > 8hm0. Suppose that the inequality holds for K <
k. In order to prove the inequality for K = k we consider two
cases: k is an even (k = 2q) or an odd number (k = 2q + 1).
Here we only prove the even case since the proof for the odd
case is similar. If k = 2q, we need to show∑
i≤q−1
(
M − hm0
i
)(
hm0/2
2q − i
)
≤
(
M − hm0
q
)(
hm0/2
q
)
.
This is true because∑
i≤q−1
(
M−hm0
i
)(
hm0/2
2q−i
)
=
∑
i≤q−1
(
M−hm0
i
)(
hm0/2
2q−2−i
)hm0/2− 2q + i+ 1
2q − i− 1
×hm0/2− 2q + i+ 2
2q − i
≤∑i≤q−1 (M−hm0i )( hm0/22q−2−i)hm0/2− qq
×hm0/2− q + 1
q + 1
≤ 2(M−hm0q−1 )(hm0/2q−1 ) (hm0/2− q)(hm0/2− q + 1)(q + 1)q
= 2
(
M−hm0
q
)(
hm0/2
q
) (hm0/2− q)q
(q + 1)(M − hm0 − q + 1)
≤ (M−hm0q )(hm0/2q )
The first inequality is due to the fact that g(x) :=
a− b+ x
b− x+ 1 is
an increasing function of x if a+1 > 0. The second inequality
1Note that for the attackers, estimating at least one of the fingerprints is
equivalent to estimating all of their fingerprints.
9is because of the induction hypothesis, and the last inequality
is valid since q/(q + 1) ≤ 1 and because of the assumption
that M ≥ 8hm0. Substituting (20) into (19) implies
p(Ei) ≤ 4
(
M−hm0
bK/2c
)(
hm0/2
b(K+1)/2c
)(
M
K
)
= 4
(
K
b(K+1)/2c
)∏b(K+1)/2c
j=1
(
1− M − bK/2c − hm0/2
M −K + j
)
×∏bK/2cj=1 (1− hm0M − bK/2c+ j
)
≤ 4
(
Ke
bK/2c
)bK/2c (
hm0/2
M−bK/2c
)b(K+1)/2c (
M−hm0
M
)bK/2c
.
The last inequality is because
(
n
n−k
)
=
(
n
k
) ≤ (ne/k)k, where
e is the Euler’s constant and the fact that 1− a/(b+ x) is an
increasing function of x when a > 0, b > 0. By considering
K to be even or odd separately, and the assumption that
M > 8hm0 one can show that the last equation in the above
inequality can be bounded as
4
(
Ke
bK/2c
)bK/2c(
hm0/2
M − bK/2c
)b(K+1)/2c(
M − hm0
M
)bK/2c
≤ 4
(
ehm0(M − hm0)
M(M −K/2)
)K/2
.
Recall that M = nm0. The result follows from applying the
union bound argument.
Proof of Lemma 5.2
It is clear that this structure satisfies the zero mean condition.
Since the elements of fingerprints are chosen uniformly, all the
elements in B(b˜) have the same likelihood for every b ∈ ΞK .
Hence, the error probability (12) can be written as
p(E) =
1
(2w + 1)K
∑
b∈ΞK
(1− 1|B(b˜)| ).
It can be proven that due to the symmetric structure of F,
|B(b˜)| = t when the elements of b have maximum distance
(2w+1−t)/z, i.e., maxi,j |bi−bj | = (2w+1−t)/z. Moreover,
|B(b˜)| ≤ 2w + 1. Using these facts we obtain∑
b∈ΞK
1− 1|B(b˜)| =
2w+1∑
t=1
(1− 1
t
)|{b : |B(b˜)| = t}|
= 2w +
2w∑
t=2
(
(t− 1)
(
(2w + 2− t)K − 2(2w + 1− t)K
+(2w − t)K
))
= (2w)K .
This implies p(E) =
(
1− 12w+1
)K
and by applying the
union bound, the result is immediate.
Proof of Lemma 5.3
In this scenario, it is clear that the performance of the
proposed attack is lower bounded by an attack in which the
attackers choose an element in B ((fi,1 − fi,1, ..., fi,1 − fi,K))
with maximum number of zeros whenever Ai ∩ U = ∅. To
analyze this attack, we consider two cases: 0 < p ≤ 1/4 and
1/4 < p < 1/2. If 0 < p ≤ 1/4, it can be shown that the
attackers might fail to learn si only when both Ai ∩ U = ∅
and the number of non-zero elements exceeds the number of
zeros. Let p(E) to be the probability of such event, then
p(E) ≤ 2
∑
j≥b(K+1)/2c
(
K
j
)
pj(1− 2p)K−j . (21)
From application of binomial expansion,
(3/2)K =
∑b(K−1)/2c
j=0
(
K
j
) 1
2j
+
∑bK/2c
j=0
(
K
j+b(K+1)/2c
) 1
2j+b(K+1)/2c
,
we obtain
bK/2c∑
j=0
(
K
j + b(K + 1)/2c
)
1
2j
≤ 2b(K+1)/2c(3/2)K . (22)
Rewrite the right hand side of (21) as follows
2pb(K+1)/2c(1− 2p)bK/2c∑bK/2cj=0 ( Kj+b(K+1)/2c)( p1− 2p
)j
(a)
≤ 2pb(K+1)/2c(1− 2p)bK/2c∑bK/2cj=0 ( Kj+b(K+1)/2c) 12j
(b)
≤ 2(2p)b(K+1)/2c(1− 2p)bK/2c(3/2)K ≤ 2
(
3
4
)K
.
Inequality (a) follows because p ≤ 1/4, thus 2p ≤ 1− 2p.
Inequality (b) follows from (22) and the last inequality is due
to the fact that max{xq+1(1− x)q, xq(1− x)q} ≤ 1
4q
, when
0 ≤ x ≤ 1− x, q ∈ N.
If 1/4 < p < 1/2, we assume the attackers make an error
any time Ai∩U = ∅ or equivalently when (fi,1, ..., fi,K) does
not include the pair (−1, 1). This happens with probability
less than 2(1 − p)K − (1 − 2p)K which is also less than
2 (3/4)
K for 1/4 < p < 1/2. Hence, p(E) ≤ 2 (3/4)K . The
result is immediate from the union bound.
Proof of Theorem 6.2
Let S =
∑N
i=1 I{Ai=[0,...,0]}. Hence, S is the number of rows
that colluders can not estimate their corresponding finger-
prints correctly, and let p(ei) to be the probability of event
{I{Ai=[0,...,0]} = 1}. We obtain
E[S] = E[E[S|ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ]] (23)
=
∑N
i=1 E[p(ei)] =
∑N
i=1 E[%Ki + (1− %i)K ]
= N
(∫ pi/2−t
t
sin2K(x) + cos2K(x)dx
)
/(pi/2− 2t).
Using the fact that∫
sinn(x)dx = − sin
n−1(x) cos(x)
n
+
n− 1
n
∫
sinn−2(x)dx,
we obtain ∫ pi/2−t
t
sin2K(x)dx (24)
≤ sin(t) + ( 2K−12K × · · · × 12) (pi/2− 2t).
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Similarly, ∫ pi/2−t
t
cos2K(x)dx (25)
≤ sin(t) + ( 2K−12K × · · · × 12) (pi/2− 2t).
Substituting (24) and (25) into (23), gives us
E[S]
N ≤ 2 sin(t)pi/2−2t + 2
(
2K−1
2K × · · · × 12
)
= 2√
300K(pi/2−2t) + 2
(2KK )
4K
a' 2√
300K(pi/2−2t′) +
2√
piK
:= C√
K
.
Where (a) uses a well known approximation which is
(
2K
K
) '
4K√
piK
. Furthermore, we obtain
V ar[S] = E[E[S2|ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ]]− E[S]2
=
∑N
i=1 E[p(ei)]− E[p(ei)]2
b≤ N(C/√K − C2/K).
(b) is true since x − x2 is an increasing function for
0 < x < 0.5. Finally, Chernoff’s bound will establish the
result.
Proof of Theorem 6.3
First we compute the mean and variance of S, i.e., the number
of rows in A that attackers can not estimate. S can be written
as
S =
N∑
i=1
I{Ai=[0,...,0]}
where I is the indicator function. Let ei to be the event that
ith row of A is entirely zeros. This event happens when either
[fi,1, ..., fi,K ] is a vector of all zeros or a vector of all ones.
Therefore,
p(ei) =
K∏
j=1
pj +
K∏
j=1
(1− pj), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (26)
where pj = sin2(rj) and rj ∼ Uniform(t′, pi/2 − t′). Now
one can obtain
E[||f1 − f̂1||2] ≤ E[S]
= E[E[S|ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ]] = NE[p(ei)]
a
= N
(
E[p1]K + (1− E[p1])K
)
b
= N/2K−1, (27)
where (a) is true since pjs are i.i.d and (b) is because of∫ pi/2−t
t
sin2(r) drpi/2−2t = 1/2.
E[S2] = E[E[S2|ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ]]
c
= E[N2p(ei)2 +Np(ei)−Np(ei)2]
= (N2 −N)E[p(ei)2] +NE[p(ei)]
= (N2 −N) (E[p21]K + E[(1− p1)2]K + 2E[p1(1− p1)]K)
+NE[p(ei)]
d≤ (N2 −N)
(
3
(
3
8
)K)
+N/2K−1, (28)
where (c) is due to the fact that S|(ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N) is a
binomial distribution with parameter p(ei) and (d) is because
of 5/16 <
∫ pi/2−t
t
sin4(r) drpi/2−2t < 3/8. Using (27), (28), and
Chernoff’s bound, we obtain
P (S ≥ N/K) <
P
(
S ≥ N/2K +N/2K−1) = P (|S −N/2K−1| > N/2K) ≤
4K2
(
3
(
3
8
)K − 4 ( 2
8
)K)
+ 4K
2
N
(
2
(
4
8
)K − 3 ( 3
8
)K)
e≤ 12K2(3
8
)K +
8K2
N
(
4
8
)K ,
(e) is true because of the fact that 3 · 3K − 4 · 2K < 3 · 3K
and 2 · 4K − 3 · 3K < 2 · 4K . Therefore, for K > 6 with
probability at least 1 − 12K2(3/8)K − 8K2(1/2)K/N , we
have S < N/K. In this case, using the Hoeffding’s inequality
and union bound we get
P
(
max
i∈K
|pi − p̂i| ≥ ρ
)
≤ 2Ke−2(N−S)ρ2 , (29)
By choosing ρ =
√
logN
N , we obtain the result.
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